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LABOR LAw - PICKETING TO CoMPEL BREACH OF A STATUTORY DuTY
CONFLICT BETWEEN NoRRis-LAGUARDIA AcT AND NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS AcT- Petitioners, a corporate employer and an A. F. of L. union
whose membership included all the company's active employees, brought suit
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in a federal court against a C. I. 0. union, whose membership included two
of petitioner's employees on strike, to enjoin respondents' picketing. The purpose of the picketing was to coerce the employer and employees to violate the
agreement entered into with the petitfoner union as exclusive bargaining agency
and to cause the employer to rescind its recognition of that union. The trial court
granted an injunction against all picketing on findings that the agreement
between the employer and the petitioner union was negotiated and consummated pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act,1 that the picketing was
without justification and unlawful, and that no labor dispute existed between the
parties. Held on appeal, reversed and remanded, with directions to dissolve
the injunction and dismiss the bill, on the ground that a labor dispute existed
between the parties, and, therefore, in the absence of findings required by section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 the trial court was without jurisdiction
to issue the injunction. Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Workers
Union, No. 2I238, (App. D. C. 1939) 105 F. (2d) I., affd. per curiam 308
U.S. 522, 60 S. Ct. 292 (1939). 8
The decision in the court of appeals is a noteworthy analysis of the applicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in cases of picketing by a minority union
for recognition when the employer is fulfilling his obligations under the National
Labor Relations Act. 4 The Supreme Court opinion, while reaffirming the literal
construction of the definition of "labor dispute" which it had adopted in two
earlier cases 5 cited in the decision, still leaves open important questions. One is
what effect a prior certification of the majority union by the National Labor
Relations Board would have had on the outcome of the case. Petitioners argued
that, if a labor dispute existed at some stage of the controversy, it was terminated
when the petitioner union was chosen by a majority of the employees as their
collective bargaining agency, because of the duty imposed on the employer
by the National Labor Relations Act to bargain collectively with the majority
union and with no other.~ However, there was conflicting evidence at the trial
as to whether the employer had coercea its employees into joining the petitioner
union, and the court of appeals dismissed the petitioners' argument on the
ground that the federal courts have no power to determine the lawful selection
of a bargaining agency, that being a matter to be determined in the first
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 151 et seq.
47 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S. C. (1934), § IOI et seq. The trial court made
no finding that unlawful acts would be continued unless restrained, or that substantial
and irreparable injury to the petitioners' property would follow, or that, as to each item
of relief granted, greater injury would be inflicted upon the petitioners by the denial
of relief than upon the respondents by the granting of it, or that petitioners had no
adequate remedy at law, or that the public officers charged with the duty of protecting the petitioners' property were unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.
3 The case is also noted in 8 GEo. W Ara. L. REV. 980 ( 1940).
4 In general, see Larson, "The Labor Relations Acts-Their Effect on Industrial
Warfare," ·36 M1cH. L. REv. 1237 (1938); 33 ILL. L. REV. 717 (1939).
5 Lau£ v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323, 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938); New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 S. Ct. 703 (1938).
~ 49 Stat. L. 449, § 8 (5) and § 9 (a) (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939),
§ 158 (5) and § 159 (a). See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U. S. l at 44, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
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instance by the labor relations board. If the board had certified the majority
union as the proper bargaining representative, then the court could have been
assured, as long as certification was e:ffective,1 that in issuing an injunction it
would have been protecting the employer in the performance of its statutory duty
under the Labor Relations Act. Nevertheless, the case would still have involved
a "labor dispute" within the literal meaning of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 8 In
cases where no fact questions as to the proper bargaining representative are
left undetermined by the board, it is arguable that the National Labor Relations Act has impliedly repealed 9 the Norris-LaGuardia Act, or at least so
much of it as limits the items of relief a court may grant.1° It may be argued
that there is an inconsistency between the two statutes in so far as the one
permits self-help remedies to establish a right to recognition of a minority union
contradictory to the right given employees to have the majority union be their
exclusive representative.11 Another question possibly left open by the decisions
of the Supreme Court is the constitutionality of applying section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,1 2 so as to permit interference with an employer's business to compel him to violate his statutory duty.18 In the principal case the
question was not before the court. 14 Had the petitioners complied with all the
On the duration of certification, see 38 CoL. L. REv. 1243 at 1253 (1938).
A case involves a labor dispute when it involves persons who are engaged in the
same industry or when it involves conflicting or competing interests in a "labor
dispute" of "persons participating or interested" therein. 47 Stat. L. 73, § 13 (a)
(1932), 29 U.S. C. (1934), § 113 (a). Therefore, even adopting the view taken in
Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers of America, (D. C. Mo. 1937) 21 F.
Supp. 20 at 26 ff., that certification ends the dispute, a court must read the disjunctive
out of the wording of the statute to hold the Norris-LaGuardia Act applicable. Never
has a court, though, found no "labor dispute" as defined in § 13 ( c), and then held
the statute applicable solely on the basis of the first part of § 13 (a). See LaRose v.
Possehl, 156 Misc. 476, 282 N. Y. S. 332 (1935), where the court expressly holds
similar provisions of the New York Anti-Injunction Act should be read in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive.
9 In Grace Co. v. Williams, (D. C. Mo. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 263, the court
indicates that in so far as the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act are in conflict the former controls.
10 47 Stat. L. 71, § 4 (1932), 29 U. S. C. (1934), § 104.
11 Grounds for saying no repeal was intended are outlined in Padway, "The
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor Relations Act," 2 NAT. LAWY. GUILD
Q. 227 at 229 (1940). The saving clause of the Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. L. 449,
§ 13 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 163, provides that nothing in the act shall
be construed to limit the right to strike. In § IO (h) of the statute there is a specific
repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act but only for the purpose of enforcing board orders.
12 47 Stat. L. 71, § 4 (1932), 29 U. S. C. (1934), § 104. No injunction may
be issued to prohibit, among other things, "Giving publicity to the existence of, or the
facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by
any other method not involving fraud or violence."
13 The same question comes up under the Fourteenth Amendment with respect
to the application of similar provisions in state anti-injunction acts.
14 The bill had been ordered dismissed on the ground of non-compliance with
§ 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the validity of which was determined in Lauf
v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 at 329, 58 S. Ct. 578 (1938). This section must
be complied with before any item of relief may be granted.
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procedural prerequisites to relief and then been denied an mJunction against
picketing only by reason of section 4, the question would have been similar to
that involved in Senn v. Tile Layers Union. 15 In that case, however, it was
found that the purpose of the picketing was lawful. Here the purpose of the
picketing, namely to compel the employer to violate its duties under the National
Labor Relations Act, was unlawful. It is clear that the object of a statute interfering with the conduct of business· must have some relation to the public welfare,
and likewise the object of interference permitted by statute should meet the
same test.16 Yet when, as in the principal case, the object of the interference is
to compel a violation of the declared legislative policy, to permit such activity
would seem directly opposed to the public welfare. The statute may be interpreted as not having the effect of legalizing such activity but only of depriving
the employer of his equitable remedy, leaving to him a damage remedy. However, a denial of the only effective remedy would logically be as much a
violation of due process as a d,enial of all remedies, and it should be possible to
show that the damage remedy is often clearly ineffective.17

15 301 U. S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857 (1937). This decision was also cited by the
Supreme Court in the principal case. It involved the constitutionality of a Wisconsin
statute applied to permit picketing to compel the owner of a plumbing shop to refrain
from doing any plumbing work himself. In Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 284, cert. den. 293 U.S. 595, 55 S. Ct. 110 (1934),
the constitutionality of § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was upheld in a case involving labor activities to obtain a closed shop.
16 The question that may be put is whether the legislature itself -could do what
it permits the union to do, i.e., provide that an employer shall violate a statute and
expose himself to its sanctions if a union wants him to do so.
17 In complying with § 7 (d) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. L. 71
(1932), 29 U. S. C. (1934), § 107 (d), the complainant must have already shown
that it has "no adequate remedy at law."

